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COMMENT
ROY A. SCHOTLAND*
I
When I first get some time with a new acquaintance, I try to get a sense of
the person by asking what she or he does when not doing law, or whatever the
job.  If asked that question myself, I answer that I enjoy reading classics like the
Early Greeks.  My favorite classic, though, is Winnie-the-Pooh, because Pooh
and I have something in common: I am a bear of very little brain.1  I lack the
imagination to see value in thin theorizing.  For example, in November 1998, at
a conference on judicial independence at the University of Southern California
Law School,2 a law professor raised the key question, “What do we mean by
‘judicial independence’?”  He proceeded to answer his own question: “Real in-
dependence would mean judges with a wide range of life experience.  The fed-
eral bench contains very few disabled people, Marxists, labor organizers, mi-
norities, or gay and lesbian people.”  Although this may be true, I lack the
imagination to find such a comment helpful in the debate about judicial inde-
pendence.
My imagination also keeps me from seeing value in trying to solve macro
problems like making the media better, a goal at which Professor Carrington’s
paper aims.  True, such a problem is as fundamental as any imaginable—but
how much can we do about it?  Another fundamental problem is whether to
have judicial elections at all, and one of the many strengths of Professor Car-
rington’s paper is that it notes the long-proven unlikelihood of getting rid of ju-
dicial elections and emphasizes the need for more work on reducing the prob-
lems in judicial elections.
The modern effort to eliminate judicial elections began in 1906 with Roscoe
Pound’s famous speech, or in 1913 when the American Judicature Society was
founded, or in 1914 when Professor Kales proposed what in 1940 became the
Missouri Plan.  After that ninety-two years of effort, we have eighty-seven per-
cent of state judges facing elections of some type.  Furthermore, we have con-
tested elections for fifty-three percent of appellate judges and seventy-seven
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percent of general-jurisdiction trial judges.3  Given these numbers, one would
hardly suspect that more sweat and ink have been spent on getting rid of judi-
cial elections than on any other single subject in the history of American law.
My point here is not to discourage anyone who wants to continue the battle,
but rather to urge those in the fray to give the appropriate focus to work on ju-
dicial election problems where we do have judicial elections.
The greatest current threat to judicial independence is the increasing politi-
cization of judicial elections.  They are becoming nastier, noisier, and costlier.
Campaign costs have soared in states as diverse as Alabama, California, Ken-
tucky, Michigan, Montana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin.  Even
with retention-only elections—the reform model—two Justices were defeated
in 1996 by single-issue groups in Nebraska and Tennessee, and another was de-
feated in 1992 in Wyoming.
Campaign conduct in many states centers on the “tough on crime” mes-
sage—and this is not the fault of television.  A striking example from the 1998
campaign is the newspaper ad run by a challenger to a trial judge, which stated
“‘Maximum Marion’ Bloss [that is, maximum sentences]: You do the crime,
you do the time.”  At the bottom of this ad, she ran a picture of her opponent.
One might wonder, why would a candidate run in her ad a picture of her oppo-
nent?  Well, the candidate is of a certain type, and her opponent is a candidate
of a certain color.
Consider as another example two campaigns twenty years ago in California,
where few if any judicial candidates could afford television advertising.  One
candidate, a law professor at Berkeley, one week before the election—after
having campaigned simply as a believer in judicial independence—flooded his
county with 100,000 fliers proclaiming, “The Issue is Rape.”  In other counties,
one incumbent’s fliers stated that he had “sent more criminals—rapists, mur-
derers, felons—to prison than any other judge in Contra Costa County history;”
another incumbent advertised his record as “Over 90% Convicted Criminals
Sentenced to Institutions.  Over 50% to State Prison.  Prison Commitment
Rate is More Than Twice the State Average.”  With such public pronounce-
ments on their commitment to fighting crime, should not such candidates be
barred from sitting in criminal cases?  After all, “[j]udges are supposed to be
judging crime not fighting it,” said a Nevada Justice recently in dissenting from
his court’s refusal to disqualify one Justice.4
What of practical value will flow from this collection of papers?  Nine years
ago, I was in Little Rock as part of an American Judicature Society effort to
reduce the problems in judicial elections.  Thanks to a perfect and packed
schedule put together by Arkansas Supreme Court Justice David Newbern, the
program could not have been better and those in attendance could not have
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been more interested.  Unfortunately, absolutely nothing came of that effort,
because everyone went away saying, “These things do not happen in Arkan-
sas.”  The very next year, as if I had been a locust bringing the plague—
although there were two unusually good candidates—the state suffered its most
disturbing and by far most expensive judicial election campaign ever.  So I ask,
“What will come out of this conference?”
II
Before I get into reform proposals, I must note two disagreements that I
have with Professor Carrington’s article.  Professor Carrington states that “no
state and no foreign country has opted for life tenure. . . .  Everyone who has
considered the question as an open one has chosen term or age limits.”5  Surely
Professor Carrington would agree that this nation’s 200-year experience with
federal courts leads us to rely on them in special ways, creating as a bedrock
necessity that we preserve Article III life tenure.  However, the reader of Pro-
fessor Carrington’s article will come away from it and say, “If judicial inde-
pendence has friends like these, it does not need enemies!”
Second, Professor Carrington seems troubled that courts have gotten into
reapportionment—but look where the alternative had put us!6  And at some
length, Professor Carrington blasts the California Supreme Court for finding
their school finance system unconstitutional.7  He argues that “values not
widely shared by the people . . . were forcibly read into the state’s constitution”
by the court; it had “pushed the envelope of its political role.”8  As another
commentator on Professor Carrington’s article said:
If the focus in defending judicial independence is on how we can best free judges to
engage in principled decision-making, it seems off the point to criticize judicial deci-
sions for failing to comport with prevailing political views. . . .  [If] the decisions may
be considered fair interpretations of the law . . . then the court deserves support. . . .9
California was the first state to find unconstitutional a typical system of
school financing.  Just within Los Angeles County, the district with the highest
assessed property value, Beverly Hills, had $50,885 per pupil but the district
with the lowest per-pupil allocation had only $3,70610—a ratio of fourteen-to-
one, almost egalitarian compared to the 700-to-one ratio found later in Texas.11
While California’s decision may have been right or wrong, judicial independ-
ence would seem to have no meaning if, where a state’s constitution has an
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equal protection clause, that state’s courts do not intervene in the face of such
egregious inequality.  As of December 1998, seventeen state supreme courts
have upheld their school financing systems, but fourteen have gone with Cali-
fornia, including two that overruled earlier decisions and a third (Idaho) which
right now seems likely to overrule.  In the years since 1989, however, fewer
state supreme courts (five) have upheld their systems than have held their sys-
tems unconstitutional (eight).12  If a state’s constitution guarantees a basic edu-
cation, or guarantees adequate public schools, what is judicial independence for
if not to stand up when, as a Harvard law professor put it, educational
“institutions in those states were comatose, drifting toward disaster.”13  For ex-
ample, the courts in Kentucky stood up for constitutional rights, leading former
Governor Bert Combs to write that “the news media from San Antonio, Texas
to London, England . . . lauded [our] School Reform Law” and “Kentucky was
singled out by President Bush as a state that used ‘creative thinking’ to trans-
form its public schools.”14  After the Arkansas Supreme Court struck down that
state’s system, the political response was so successful that it made a national
reputation for then-Governor William Jefferson Clinton.  Whichever way one
thinks a court should decide such cases, it is clear neither answer amounts to
runaway judicial activism, but—right or wrong—the court’s decision is entitled
to support as an exercise of judicial independence.
Brown v. Board of Education15 stated that “education is perhaps the most
important function of state and local governments.”16  Is not the whole purpose
of judicial independence to uphold the rule of law?  Deciding what the law re-
quires is often arguable.  But it is not arguable that courts should be able to
make such decisions without fear or favor of other officials, powerful interests,
or what Professor Carrington calls “political crossfires.”  This is the essence of
judicial independence.
III
How real is “judicial independence” if the judges stand for reelection every
two years?  Or every four years?  The tables in the Appendix display data on
judicial term lengths, and demonstrate that these are not hypothetical horrors:
Thirty percent of elective trial judges (on courts of general jurisdiction) serve
initial terms of four years or shorter.  Of elected appellate judges, twenty-eight
percent have two-year (or shorter) initial terms, and another four percent have
only three or four years.
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The length of subsequent terms are slightly better: Only nineteen percent of
all trial judges, and only one percent of appellate judges, have subsequent
terms of four-year terms or fewer.  However, sixty-two percent of the elected
trial judges, and forty-five percent of elected appellate judges, serve subsequent
terns of only six years.
Every state, whatever its judicial election system, has one overriding goal:
to balance judicial independence and judicial accountability.  Unduly short
terms, however, do not merely challenge judicial independence—they are in-
consistent with it.  Opinions will differ on what term length is “unduly short,”
but I expect a large majority would agree that for judges, a term of six years or
fewer is too short.
Shorter judicial terms, moreover, cause more campaign finance problems
and more campaign conduct problems.  The need to campaign frequently de-
ters many people who would be admirable judges from standing for election,
and pushes many of the ablest judges off the bench.  Even if the positions are
appointive (or elective but almost never contested), short-term positions are
inherently less attractive.  Term lengths that properly balance independence
and accountability will do much to bring able people to the bench and help
keep them there.
Changing to reasonable term-lengths, and amending the Model Code of Ju-
dicial Conduct to include the judicial campaign finance reforms that will be
voted upon by the ABA House of Delegates in August 1999,17 will go far to
keep judicial campaigns from becoming noisier, nastier, and costlier than they
already are.  These reforms will increase judicial independence.  As New Jer-
sey’s great Chief Justice Arthur T. Vanderbilt often said, “judicial reform is not
for the short-winded.”
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encouraging appropriate judicial campaign conduct by establishing unofficial citizen committees for
campaign oversight.
SCHOTLAND.FMT 04/01/99  8:51 PM
154 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 61: No. 3
APPENDIX†
TABLE 1
SUMMARY OF ELECTORAL STATUS OF STATE JUDGES
Judges Appellate Courts Trial Courts
Stand for some form of election 1,084 (87%) 7,380 (87%)
Do not stand for some form of election    159 (13%) 1,111 (13%)
Total 1,243 (100%) 8,491 (100%)
TABLE 2
TERM LENGTH FOR ALL STATE APPELLATE JUDGES
Length of term Appellate Courts*
Initial Term Subsequent Terms
2 years or fewer 305 (25.9%) —
3-4 years   38 (3.2%)   10 (0.8%)
6 years 346 (29.4%) 510 (44.5%)
7-8 years 151 (12.8%) 194 (16.9%)
10 years 168 (14.3%) 226 (19.7%)
11-15 years 138 (11.7%) 177 (15.4%)
15 years or more   31 (2.6%)   39 (3.4%)
* Not included are New York’s intermediate appellate judges, who are appointed from judges
who had been elected to the trial courts.
TABLE 3
TERM LENGTH FOR ELECTED APPELLATE JUDGES
Length of term* Appellate Courts
Initial Term Subsequent Terms
2 years or fewer 305 (28.2%) —
3-4 years   38 (3.5%)   10 (0.9%)
6 years 332 (30.6%) 486 (44.8%)
7-8 years   89 (8.2%) 171 (15.8%)
10 years 154 (14.2%) 212 (19.6%)
11-15 years 166 (15.3%) 205 (18.9%)
* Of all elected appellate judges, 40.4% (438) are appointed for initial terms of four years of
fewer and then face only retention elections.
In all elective systems, a majority of judges initially reach the bench by appointment to va-
cancies.
                                                          
† Sources: ABA TASK FORCE ON LAWYERS’ POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS, Part II, 69 (July
1998) (corrected for recategorization of one state); AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, JUDICIAL
SELECTION IN THE STATES (1998); NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT
CASELOAD STATISTICS (1996).
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TABLE 4
TERM LENGTH FOR ALL STATE TRIAL COURT
(GENERAL JURISDICTION) JUDGES
Length of term Trial Court of general jurisdiction
Initial term Subsequent terms
2 years or fewer   868 (10.2%) —
3-4 years 1450 (17.1%) 1506 (18.0%)
6 years 3966 46.7%) 4646 (55.5%)
7-8 years 1134 13.4%)   618 (7.4%)
10 years   408 (4.8%)   408 (4.9%)
11-15 years   538 (6.3%)   814 (9.7%)
15 years or more   127 (1.5%)   372 (4.5%)
TABLE 5
TERM LENGTH FOR ELECTED TRIAL COURT
(GENERAL JURISDICTION) JUDGES
Length of term* Trial Court of general jurisdiction
Initial term Subsequent  terms
2 years or fewer   868 (11.76%) —
3-4 years 1377 (18.66%) 1433 (19.41%)
6 years 3884 (52.63%) 4564 (61.84%)
7-8 years   428 (5.80%)   428 (5.80%)
10 years   366 (4.95%)   366 (4.95%)
11-15 years   457 (6.20%)   589 (8.00%)
* Of all elected trial judges, 13.8% (1019) are appointed for initial terms of four years of fewer
and then face only retention elections.
In all elective systems, a majority of judges initially reach the bench by appointment to va-
cancies.
